whatever condition it might will upon those who desired to contract to furnish labor for the city, a subdivision of the state, for which no one had an absolute right to perform labor. It would seem that the principal case is based upon logically sound legal principles.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—INTERSTATE COMMERCE—DUE PROCESS—"FULL CREW" ACT.—The Act of June 19, 1911, Pa. P. L. 1053, commonly known as the "Full Crew Act", provided for the management of trains requiring the crews to be composed of a certain number. The appellants filed a bill to enjoin the appellees, the Pennsylvania State Railroad Commission, from enforcing this act on the ground that it was unconstitutional and void, in that property would be taken without due process of law, a compliance with the act would necessarily result in a great expenditure of money, and also because it constituted an interference with interstate commerce. *Held,* that the act was constitutional. *Pennsylvania Railroad Co.* v. *Ewing et al.* (Pa. 1913) 88 Atl. 775.

The decision in the principal case that the act is within the police power of the State and not an interference with interstate commerce is in harmony with the holdings of the United States Supreme Court; *N. Y., N. H., & H. R. Co.* v. *N. Y.*, 165 U. S. 628, 17 Sup. Ct. 418, 41 L. Ed. 853, forbidding the heating of cars by stoves; *Smith* v. *Alabama,* 124 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 564, 31 L. Ed. 508; *Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co.* v. *Alabama,* 128 U. S. 96, 9 Sup. Ct. 28, 32 L. Ed. 352, requiring examination of engineers; and *Chic., R. I. & Pac. R. Co.* v. *Arkansas,* 219 U. S. 453, 31 Sup. Ct. 275, 55 L. Ed. 290, which sustained a "full crew" act; and *Pitts., Cin., Chic. & St. L. Ry. Co.* v. *Indiana,* 223 U. S. 713, upholding, without opinion, a like statute of Indiana. That uncompensated obedience to laws passed in the valid exercise of police power is not a taking of property without due process of law, as held in the principal case, was decided by *New Orleans Gaslight Co.,* v. *Drainage Commission,* 197 U. S. 453, 25 Sup. Ct. 471, 49 L. Ed. 831; *Chic. B. & Q. R. R.* v. *Chicago,* 166 U. S. 226, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979; *Detroit, Ft. W. & B. O. Ry. Co.* v. *Osborn,* 189 U. S. 383, 23 Sup. Ct. 540, 47 L. Ed. 860; *N. Pac. Ry. Co.* v. *Minn. ex rel. Dutulh,* 208 U. S. 583, 28 Sup. Ct. 341, 52 L. Ed. 630. The charge is sometimes made that the courts have often in the past usurped the function of the legislature and declared invalid an exercise of police power because of unreasonableness and inexpediency in a particular case. Yet in the principal case, though the appellant clearly showed that large expenditures would be necessary to comply with an act of very doubtful efficacy, the court (although other courts have been led astray by far weaker arguments) did not deviate from the sound constitutional doctrine that the question of expediency is for the legislature. COOLEY, CONST. LIM., c. 7, § 4 (6th Ed. 1890, pp. 197-201); *Jacobson* v. *Mass.,* 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643, 3 Ann. Cas. 765; *McLean* v. *Arkansas,* 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206, 53 L. Ed. 315.

CORPORATIONS—DISSOLUTION ON SUIT OF A MINORITY STOCKHOLDER.—Plaintiff, a minority stockholder of the defendant corporation, brought suit to have the corporation dissolved on the ground that circumstances had